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Executive Summary
Sunni marginalisation continues to be the principle narrative of Iraq experts and policy analysts 
when commenting on the status of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Indeed, the Iraqi government’s pursuit of 
sectarian and exclusionary policies towards the Sunni Arabs following the post-2003 invasion 
generated widespread feelings of marginalisation among members of the Sunni community. 
The Sunnis of Salah al-Din province have arguably been subjected to particularly acute forms 
of exclusion due to their real and perceived ties to the Ba’ath regime and later to anti-Baghdad 
insurgent and extremist groups such as the AQI and IS. The Iraqi authorities have systemically 
sought to prevent Salah al-Din from becoming the centre of Sunni power in Iraq and have kept 
the Sunni citizens in the province under the pressure of large numbers of security forces.  
However, within this broader picture of marginalisation and security pressure the leader 
of a small Sunni Arab party with no armed wing —Ahmed Abdullah al-Jabouri (known as 
Abu Mazin)—has emerged as a key power broker in Salah al-Din and generated widespread 
influence in the province. Known as the “King of Salah al-Din”, Abu Mazin has proved adept at 
navigating and cultivating relationships with tribal groups, Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization 
Forces (PMF), parliamentarians in Baghdad and other figures in order to shore up a strong 
political position in the province. He effectively controls the provincial government through 
proxies and has successfully warded challengers to his rule backed by powerful PMF figures. 
How has a Sunni Arab figure like Abu Mazin accomplished this political feat? This research 
examines the roots and mechanisms of Abu Mazin’s power in Salah al-Din from the lens 
of Political Marketplace. The research relies on both primary and secondary sources and 
demonstrates that Abu Mazin’s influence is rooted in a set of levers of power that include 
tribal connections, transactional exchanges, alliance with Shia militia parties and figures, and 
identity politics. While each of these mechanisms has been important to Abu Mazin’s control 
and influence in the province, his survival as a key power broker ultimately depends on his 
alliance with the Shia stakeholders powerful in both Baghdad and on the ground in Salah al-
Din. 
By examining the mechanisms of power that enabled Abu Mazin to gain and maintain oversized 
influence, this research engages broader debates around the role and marginalisation of 
Sunni Arabs in the post-2003 order. While it is accurate to say that subsets of the Sunni Arab 
population remain structurally disadvantaged in the post-2003 order, the same cannot be said 
for their top political leaders. Sunni Arab elites such as Abu Mazin are not excluded from the 
Muhasssasah system that divides up the spoils of the state among a narrow cadre of leaders. 
On the contrary, they have embraced and perpetuated the very system they publicly disavow. 
The research proposes that in order to influence the dynamics of the Political Marketplace 
in Salah al-Din, reform minded officials in the Government of Iraq (GoI) with the support of 
international community (UNAMI, European Union, US, and the UK) should take the following 
steps: 
• Restore effective oversight mechanisms to fight corruption in the province’s governing 
institutions.
• Hold provincial elections in order to change the current power dynamics and re-establish 
public authority in the province.
• Devise a security policy in Salah al-Din that is more appreciative of the Sunni citizens’ 
concerns.
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Introduction1 
In the years following the US-led invasion, de-
Ba’athification and sectarian policies of Nouri 
al-Maliki led to widespread sense of political 
marginalisation among Sunni Arabs.2 Salah al-din 
province was arguably dealt the most dramatic 
blow by such policies. The overwhelming 
majority of the governorate’s inhabitants 
are Sunni Arabs whose real and perceived 
association with Iraq’s former dictator Saddam 
Hussein and his Ba’ath regime subjected them 
to particularly acute exclusion in the post-
2003 order.3 During Saddam’s rule, Tikrit—the 
provincial capital and Saddam’s hometown— 
operated as the centre of power and the city’s 
residents became prominent members of the 
Ba’ath party and occupied significant military 
and government positions.4 Under the post-
2003 political class, Tikrit residents of Salah 
al-Din were treated by influential political leaders 
as representing the former regime and have, 
as a result, paid a heavy price.5 Iraq’s former 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2014), for 
instance, systemically sought to marginalise 
the residents of Salah al-Din and prevent the 
province from becoming a locus of power again.6 
Two key events in the governorate intensified 
this dynamic of marginalisation. The first 
was the AQI’s 2006 bombing of the al-Askaria 
1  The research depends on both primary and secondary data to support its arguments and analysis. The primary data was collected through in-person 
and phone interviews with key local politicians/party members, government officials (both current and former officials), observers, and journalists. Almost 
all interviewees demanded anonymity. The secondary data was collected from policy reports and journal articles as well as from Iraqi and international 
media (TV reports and programmes, news websites, and online journals and magazines). 
2  Stephen Wicken, ‘Iraq’s Sunnis In Crisis’, Institute For The Study Of War’s Middle East Security Report II, February 2011. Available at: http://www.under-
standingwar.org/sites/default/files/Wicken-Sunni-In-Iraq.pdf  
3  Ali Abel Sadah, ‘Iraq: Mixed Legacy In Saddam’s Hometown’, al-monitor, (March 2013). Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2013/03/iraq-tikrit-marginalized.html 
4  Colin Freeman, ‘Iraq dispatches: ten years on from Saddam’s fall, his home town of Tikrit still mourns him’, The Telegraph, (March 2013). Available 
at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9934714/Iraq-dispatch-ten-years-on-from-Saddams-fall-his-home-town-of-Tikrit-still-
mourns-him.html 
5  Mina Al-Lami, ‘Tikrit: Iraq’s City of palaces’, BBC Monitoring, (March 2015). Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31850648 
6  Sadah, 2013, Op.Cit. 
7  Robert F. Worth, ‘Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury’, The New York Times, (February 2006). Available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/blast-destroys-shrine-in-iraq-setting-off-sectarian.html  
8  Road Nordland & Alissa J. Roben, ‘Massacre Claims Shakes Iraq’, The New York Times, (June 2014). Available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/16/world/middleeast/iraq.html 
9  Ghazwan Hassan al-Jabouri, Family Feuds That Last, And Last: As Extremists Withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraqi Tribes Demand Justice’, Niqash, October 
2015. Available at: https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5138/ 
10  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government and security officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, 
July 1– September 25, 2020.
11  The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo), ‘Irak: Security and internally displaced people in Salahaddin province’, (March 2015). 
Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/55b7535d4.pdf 
12  Michael Knights, ‘Iran’s Expanding Miltia Army in Iraq: The New Speciall Group’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 12, issue 7, August 2010, pp. 1-12. Available at: 
https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/, p.4-5.
13  Amnesty International, ‘Iraq: Turning A Blind Eye: The Arming of The Popular Mobilization Units’, Januray 2017. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/
download/Documents/MDE1453862017ENGLISH.PDF , p.20. 
14  Erica Gaston & Mario Domisse, ‘At the Tip of the Spear: Armed Groups’ Impact on Displacement and Return in Post-ISIL Iraq’, GPPI, February 2019. 
Available at: https://www.gppi.net/2019/02/18/at-the-tip-of-the-spear 
15  Belkis Wille, ‘Iraq: Not a Homecoming’, Human Rights Watch, June 2019. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/14/iraq-not-homecoming   
Shia Shrine in the province’s Samarra city 
that sparked the 2006-2007 sectarian war in 
Iraq.7 The second was the infamous Speicher 
massacre of 2014. After IS took over large parts 
of the province almost without a fight in June 
2014, militants of the extremist group executed 
hundreds of Iraqi military recruits (mostly Shia) 
at Camp Speicher just outside Tikrit.8 Reports 
stated that members of some of the province’s 
Sunni Arab tribes, including Albu Nassir and Albu 
Ajil, collaborated with IS and even participated 
in the massacre.9 These events have shaped the 
mind of Iraq’s authorities and armed groups and 
influenced their policies towards the province 
and its Sunni residents.10 This is manifested, for 
instance, in the Baghdad government’s hyper 
cautious approach to security in the province. 
Every corner of Salah al-Din is covered with 
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Shia militia 
groups gathered under the umbrella of the 
Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).11  Different 
PMFs have carved out separate spheres of 
influence across the province, controlling roads, 
businesses,12 and population movements.13 The 
same forces have prevented  scores of IDPs 
from returning and have been involved in the 
violation of the Sunnis’ human rights including 
harassment, illegal arrests,14 and enforced 
disappearances.15  
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Within this broader picture of marginalisation 
and immense security pressure from both the 
ISF and the PMF, paradoxically the leader of a 
relatively small Sunni Arab political party with no 
military wing – Ahmed Abdulla al-Jabouri known 
as Abu Mazin 16 – has garnered widespread 
influence and become known as the “King of 
Salah al-Din”.17 In recent years, Abu Mazin has 
proved adept at navigating and cultivating 
relationships with tribal groups, Iran-aligned PMF 
forces, parliamentarians in Baghdad and other 
figures in order to shore up a strong political 
position in the province. He effectively controls 
the provincial government through proxies and 
has successfully warded challengers to his rule 
backed by powerful PMF figures. 
How has this political feat been accomplished? 
This research examines the roots of Abu 
Mazn’s power in Salah al-Din from the lens of 
Political Marketplace framework18. The research 
demonstrates that Abu Mazin’s influence is 
rooted in a set of levers of power that include 
tribal connections, transactional exchanges, 
alliance with Shia militia parties and figures, and 
identity politics. By examining the mechanisms 
of power that enabled Abu Mazin to gain and 
maintain oversized influence, this research 
engages broader debates around the role and 
marginalisation of Sunni Arabs in the post-2003 
order. While it is accurate to say that subsets of 
the Sunni Arab population remain structurally 
disadvantaged in the post-2003 order, the same 
cannot be said for their top political leaders. 
Sunni Arab elites such as Abu Mazin are not 
excluded from the Muhassasah system19 that 
divides up the spoils of the state among a 
narrow cadre of leaders. On the contrary, they 
16  Abu Mazn is among the Iraqi officials sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2019  for violating human rights and corruption: Press Release, ‘Treasury 
Sanctions Persons Associated with Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corrupt Actors in Iraq’, U.S. Department of The Treasury, July 18, 2019. Available at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm735
17 See for instance: Asia TV, ‘al-Munawara with Ghazwan Jasim: Abu Mazin, the King of Salah al-Din’, February 27, 2019. Available at: https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=OzolBHDuT84&amp;feature=share . Abu Mazin’s followers and close associates also call him the “Strongman زعيم”.
18  Simply defined, a political marketplace is “a political system in which transactions or deals dominate institutions, laws and regulations.” Under such 
system, allegiances and political services are purchased in exchange for material gains. The ultimate goal of political leaders and elites in a political mar-
ketplace is to possess and maintain power. See: Benjamin Spats & Alex de Waal, ‘Framing Paper: Political Marketplace Framework Methods and Metrics 
Workshop’, LSE/Conflict Research Programme (CRP), Unpublished Workshop Paper, February 18, 2019. Alex de Waal, ‘Introduction to the Political Market-
place for Policymakers’, The Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP)/World Peace Foundation, March 2016. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/
ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Research-Programme/policy-reports/JSRP-Brief-1.pdf. For the application of political marketplace theory on the national 
level in Iraq see: Toby Dodge et al., ‘Iraq Synthesis Paper: Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq’, LSE Middle East Centre, October 2018. Available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90514/. For the application of political marketplace theory on the subnational level in Iraq see:  Mac Skelton and Zmkan Ali Saleem, 
‘Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level: The Struggle for Power in Three Provinces’, LSE/Conflict Research Programme (CRP), 2020. Available 
at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/105184/3/Iraq_s_Political_Marketplace.pdf  
19  Toby Dodge, ‘Beyond structure and agency: Rethinking political identities in Iraq after 2003’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol.26, No.1, 2020. 
20  Ghazwan Hassan al-Jabouri, ‘Salahaddin government: conflict between cousins over money, power, and influence’, Niqash, (March 3, 2016). Available 
at: https://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/politics/5218/حكومة-صالح-الدين-»صراع-أوالد-العم«على-المال-والسلطة-والنفوذ.htm
21  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
22  Al-Arabiya.net, ‘Iraq: arrest warrant issued for Salah al-Dina’s former governor’, (November 24, 2019). Available at:  https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-
and-world/iraq/2019/11/24/العراق-صدور-أمر-قبض-بحق-محافظ-صالح-الدين-السابق
have embraced and perpetuated the very system 
they publicly disavow.  
Abu Mazin’s levers of power in 
Salah al-Din  
Currently an Iraqi MP, Abu Mazin is the most 
influential Sunni politician in Salah al-Din. In this 
province’s fragmented political field, a number 
of Sunni parties and factions have intensely 
competed for local power and control.20 In 
addition to Abu Mazin’s al-Jamahir al-Wataniya 
party (حزب الجماهير الوطنية ), other parties such the 
Iraq Islamic Party (IIP), al-Masar al-Madani party 
 ,(حزب التقدم) al-Taqadum party ,(حزب المسار المدني)
and al-Watan party (حزب الوطن) have competed 
for controlling the governing institutions in 
Salah al-Din and expanding influence within the 
province’s Sunni community.21 Abu Mazin has 
been the principal winner of this competition for 
power. He has built a relatively large and stable 
support base in the northern and central part 
of the province allowing him to form his own 
coalition in the local and national representative 
bodies (in both the provincial council in Salah al-
Din and the Iraqi parliament). More importantly, 
he has secured key positions in the local 
government —including the governor’s office— 
for himself and members of his al-Jamahir party 
since 2011.22
In a governorate that lacks large economic 
assets (oil infrastructure, border crossings, and 
ports), control over key government institutions 
has provided Abu Mazin and his followers 
with considerable power over designing and 
implementing the administrative and economic 
policies in the province and allowed them access 
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to large funds received by the local government.23 
This government control has enabled Abu Mazin 
to side-line and remove government officials and 
administrators who opposed and challenged his 
influence in the province.24  
More importantly, Abu Mazin’s influence survived 
the rise and fall of IS in Salah al-Din. The fall 
of Nineveh to IS, for instance, resulted in the 
demise of the influence of Atheel al-Nujaifi and 
his Sunni dominated al-Hadba coalition in the 
province. Held accountable for the fall of Mosul 
to the extremist group, Atheel was removed 
from the position of Nineveh’s governor while 
his coalition collapsed after the defeat of IS.25 
The decision to remove Atheel from power was 
influenced by powerful Shia figures and militia 
parties who emerged as prominent actors in 
Nineveh in the post IS period.26 In contrast, Abu 
Mazin did not came under scrutiny for the fall 
of Salah al-Din to IS even though he held the 
position of governor when the province was 
overtaken. After the defeat of IS, he regained 
control of the governor’s position with the help of 
Shia influential figures and militia parties. 
23  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
24  Ibid. 
25  Zmkan Ali Saleem, & J. Mac Skelton, Mosul And Basra After The Protests: The Roots Of Government Failure & Popular Discontent, IRIS Working Paper, 
2019. Available at: https://auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/files/Saleem%2C%20Skelton%20-%20Oct%202019.pdf, pp. 15-17. 
26  Ibid. 
27  A man on the streets of Tikrit said just before the national elections of May 2018 . Al-Hadath al-Iraqi, ‘Tribal authority and political money: will Salah al-
Din remain in the hands of al-Jabour?’, (March 8, 2018). Available at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHq1ENfnnc8&feature=share 
28  Abu Mazin’s tribe is called al-Hajaj that inhabit the town of Beji. In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials 
from Salah al-Din, July 1– September 25, 2020.
29  Almadapress.net, ‘Courts and tribal balance impede the appointment of a new governor for Salah al-Din’, (September 2017). Available at: https://alm-
adapaper.net/view.php?cat=175799 
30  Al-Jabouri, (2016), Op.Cit. 
31  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
32  Osama Gharizi And Haider Al-Ibrahimi, ‘Baghdad Must Seize The Chance To Work With Iraq’s Tribes’, War On The Rock, (January 2018). Available at: 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/baghdad-must-seize-chance-work-iraqs-tribes/ 
33  Hosham Dawod, ‘The Sunni Tribes in Iraq: between local power, the international coalition and the Islamic State’, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource 
Centre’, September 2015. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193513/07671d6382e449e19b93ac98a0f69063.pdf  
34  The formation of the Awakening movement beginning with 2006 centred on Anbar and only a small number of tribal fighters joined the movement in 
Salah al-Din. See: Najim Abed Al-Jabouri And Sterling Jensen, ‘The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening’, Prism, Vol.2, No.1, (2010), pp.3-18. Available 
at: https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-1/prism_volume_2_issue_1.pdf 
35  For instance, only a certain section of al-Jabour around the district of al-Alam joined Nouri al-Maliki’s Tribal Support Council Initiative (known as Isnad) 
that aimed at co-opting tribes across Iraq. See:  Nicholas A. Heras, ‘Iraqi PMU Commander Shykh Wanas Naji al-Jabara al-Jabouri: Holding the Line in Salah 
al-Din’, Jamestown Foundation’s Militatnt Leadership Monitor, Vol.8, No.12, (2018). Available at: https://jamestown.org/brief/iraqi-pmu-commander-shaykh-
wanas-naji-al-jabara-al-jabouri-holding-line-salah-al-din/ 
Tribal connections 
It is going to be the same. They will remove a 
Jabouri from office and replace him with another 
Jabouri. They already agreed on this. 27
Salah al-Din is characterised by its tribal nature, 
and tribalism is a key factor that accounts 
for Abu Mazin’s political and government 
influence in the province. He is a member of al-
Jabour tribes,28 the largest and most powerful 
confederation of Sunni Arab tribes inhabiting 
the northern and central cities and towns of 
the province including Shirgat, Beji, Tikrit, and 
al-Alam.29 He has built strong ties with large 
sections of al-Jabour and successfully used 
these tribal connections to secure stable 
electoral and political support among them.30 
Observers and government officials from the 
province said that the relationship between Abu 
Mazin and his tribe was mutually beneficial. They 
explained that Abu Mazin prioritised serving the 
interests of al-Jabour by providing them with 
access to government jobs and funds, and in 
return, he received the tribe’s votes and support.31 
Like many of Iraq’s Sunni tribes,32 al-Jabour is 
politically prominent and has retained significant 
authority in northern and central parts of Salah 
al-Din.33 Unlike the tribes in Anbar, most of 
al-Jabour in Salah al-Din refused to become 
part of the U.S. sponsored tribal Awakening 
movement34 and rejected direct co-optation by 
the Baghdad government.35  During the rule of 
Iraq’s former dictator, many members of the 
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tribe occupied key positions within the state (in 
both the government and the army). However, 
they were removed from power in the post-
2003 period via de-Bathification (2003-2007).36 
A government official from the province stated, 
“the tribes in Salah al-Din sympathised with 
the Sunni insurgency and the Ba’tahists and 
remained suspicious of both the Americans 
and the authorities in Baghdad. Not many tribes 
wanted to support the U.S. forces and the Iraqi 
government during the first decade after the 
invasion.”37 
While it retained large autonomy, al-Jabour 
still needed access to state funds and jobs. 
Abu Mazin provided the tribes with access to 
the state resources and directed al-Jabour’s 
mobilising power towards serving his political 
interests. A former affiliate of Abu Mazin stated, 
“tribal leaders support Abu Mazin because he 
delivers on his promises for providing jobs and 
other benefits.”38 Abu Mazin built this credibility 
among the tribes through his uninterrupted 
access to state resources.
Since 2003, Abu Mazin has occupied several 
key state positions in both Salah al-Din and in 
Baghdad. He served as deputy governor for 
security affairs (2003-2009), a governor (2011-
2014 and again 2016-2018), an MP from Salah 
al-Din (2014-2015 and again 2018-recent), and 
State Minister for Governorates’ Affairs (2015-
2016). These are key government positions 
in Iraq that allow their holders to influence 
employment and resource/funds distribution. 
Abu Mazin ensured that Jabouris occupied 
significant government positions in the province 
(for example the position of the governor), that 
Jabouris were prioritised for employment in the 
public sector, and that Jabouri tribal leaders 
received government funds and resources (for 
instance, companies owned by members of al-
Jabour secured contracts for implementation 
36  Sada, (2013), Op.Cit. 
37  Interview with a government official from Salah al-Din. Erbil, August 2020. 
37     Phone interview with a former affiliate of Abu Mazin. August 2020. 
39  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
40  Interview with a government official from Salah al-Din. Erbil, August 2020.
41 Erica Gaston, ‘Sunni Tribal Forces’, GPPI, (August 2017). Available at: https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/30/sunni-tribal-forces
42  Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Ruinous Aftermath: Militia Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit’, (September 2015). Available at:  https://www.hrw.
org/report/2015/09/20/ruinous-aftermath/militias-abuses-following-iraqs-recapture-tikrit  
43  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
of government service projects).39 A former 
government official from the province stated, 
“Abu Mazin offered a lot to al-Jabour. He 
ensured that government service projects 
disproportionately benefited al-Jabour inhabited 
areas. He showered al-Jabour with jobs, cash, 
and service projects. He distributes large sums 
of the funds and resources that he obtains over 
members of his tribe. He was the best candidate 
for receiving the backings of al-Jabour tribes.”40 
But facilitating access to state resources does 
not entirely explain why Jabouris have favoured 
Abu Mazin over other politicians from the 
tribe. His acceptance among many Jabouris 
is partially related in his ability to maintain a 
balance between building alliances with powerful 
Shia figures and militia parties on the one hand 
and avoiding attachment to these militia parties 
and figures on the other hand. In an analysis on 
the Sunni tribal forces in Salah al-Din, an expert 
observed “many Sunni tribal leaders deeply 
mistrust Shi’a PMF and even those who later 
joined Shi’a PMF expressed mistrust for their 
motives in Salah al-Din.”41 Like the rest of the 
Sunni Arab tribes in the province, many Jabouris 
distrust the Shia militias and blame them for the 
destruction, killings, and lootings42 that took place 
in their province during and in the aftermath 
of the war with IS.43 The province’s Jabouri 
politicians and government officials who failed 
to keep distance from the Shia militia leaders 
and groups were therefore unable to garner the 
support of the majority of their tribe. 
This has been the case with Yazan al-Jabouri 
who came to prominence in the province during 
the fight against IS. He played a key role in 
forming brigade 51 of the PMF (commonly 
referred to as Salah al-Din brigade), a Sunni Arab 
fighting force that helped in clearing Shirgat 
from IS and still operates in the areas north of 
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Tikrit (Beji & Shirgat).44 Yazan formed the Sunni 
militia with the support of Abu Mahdi Muhandis,45 
the deputy head of the PMF and the leader of 
pro-Iran militia of Kataib Hizbullah (KH) killed 
in a US drone attack in January 2020. Yazan 
became a close affiliate of Muhandis and was 
later elevated to a leading position in the PMF.46 
He started to highlight and take pride in his close 
relationships with Muhandis during numerous 
media appearances. 
Yazan’s moves, however, were not acceptable to 
many Jabouris for whom Muhandis symbolised 
the radicalism of Shia militias causing large 
scale destruction and committed human rights 
violations in Salah al-Din, particularly in Tikrit 
and Beji.47 Lack of support for Yazan among 
the Jabouris was manifested during the 2018 
elections. Yazan ran for the elections as a 
candidate of Fatah alliance, the pro-Shia militia 
coalition, from the province but failed to secure a 
seat in Iraqi parliament.48  
In contrast, many Jabouris have continued 
supporting Abu Mazin despite the fact that he 
has enjoyed the backing of al-Maliki and entered 
into alliance with Shia militia parties such as 
Badr and the Asayib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), (as 
part of the Sunni Mihwar coalition, Abu Mazin 
sided with the Construction parliamentary bloc 
led by Shia leaders like Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi 
Ameri and Qais al-Khazali). Unlike Yazan, Abu 
Mazin did not become a member of Shia militia 
organisations. Instead, he made alliances and 
connections with Baghdad-based influential Shia 
leaders and militia parties to ensure his own 
survival and secure access to state resources. 
Simultaneously, he has operated on behalf of 
al-Jamahir party and its followers in Salah al-
Din and beyond. This pragmatism of Abu Mazin, 
which also benefited the members of his tribe, 
has been acceptable to many Jabouris in the 
province. This, for instance, partly explains why 
Abu Mazin’s coalition came first during the 2018 
44  Nour Samaha, ‘Iraq’s ‘Good Sunni’’, Foreign Policy, November 16, 2016. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/iraqs-good-sunni/ 
45  Ibid. 
46  Biladi TV, ‘Special interview with Yazan Mash’an the leader in the PMF’, (February 2017). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_k1jgxWkaM&fea-
ture=share 
47  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
48  Nrttv.com, ‘The most known candidates who lost in the parliamentary elections’, (May 2018). Available at: https://www.nrttv.com/AR/News.aspx-
?id=603&MapID=2  
49  See the official results of the 2018 elections at: http://ihec.iq/getattachment/HOME/IconFiles/pageC3/salah-k-(2).pdf.aspx?lang=ar-IQ 
50  Almadapress.net, (2017), Op.Cit. See also this TV programme on the struggle between al-Jabour and al-Sawamra over power in Salah al-Din: Asia TV, ‘ 
Salahaddin after the Sawamra’, al-Munawar Show, February 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlHLJiHi6oM
51  Ghazwan Hassan al-Jabouri, ‘Former Salahaddin governor included in the sanctions: U.S. treasury decision might change the political map in Salahad-
din’, Niqash, (October 2019). Available at: https://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/politics/5998/
national elections in Salah al-Din by securing 3 
seats out of the total 12 seats allocated to the 
province.49  
Alliance with al-Jabour tribes constitute a key 
element of Abu Mazin’s power in Salah al-Din.  
As stated earlier, many Jabouris support Abu 
Mazin because the latter provided employment 
and resources for the former. The question now 
is how has Abu Mazin ensured stable access 
to state resources and jobs which allowed 
him to maintain his local support base? The 
next section looks at transactional exchange 
as another key lever of power that enabled 
Abu Mazin to control significant government 
positions and funds in Salah al-Din. 
Transactional exchanges 
Abu Mazin and his al-Jamahir party have 
operated in a highly competitive and fragmented 
political/tribal field where an array of other Sunni 
parties and figures aligned with non-Jabouri 
tribes competed for power and influence in 
Salah al-Din. For instance, Al-Sawamra tribes,50 
inhabiting Samarra and its outlining areas, 
opposed al-Jabour’s domination in the province 
and became support bases for Abu Mazin’s 
rivalling parties and personalities such as the 
IIP, Ahmed al-Krayeem’s Taqadum party, and 
Muthana al-Samaraayee’s al-Massar party.51 
These parties have competed for power—
government positions and funds— with Abu 
Mazin but have so far failed to contain the 
latter’s large government influence. Abu Mazin 
has often relied on political transactions, defined 
as buying loyalties in return for material gains, 
to gain and maintain power within a highly 
competitive political/tribal field. 
This lever of power was essential in allowing 
Abu Mazin to control and maintain the 
position of the governor, the key position in the 
province, through ensuring that the majority 
of the members of the Provincial Council (PC) 
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remained loyal to him and his policies. During 
the rule of the Ba’ath regime, governors were 
selected from Baghdad with no local input. 
The post 2003 order introduced PCs to local 
government structures in order to allow for 
greater local participation in governance and 
politics.52 Elected via popular elections every 
four years (called provincial elections), the PCs 
were vested with crucial authorities including 
appointing and removing governors.53 More 
importantly, the PCs were supposed to hold 
the local officials accountable and operate as 
an oversight mechanism on the policies of 
the governors whose authorities and powers 
were expanded through Iraq’s decentralisation 
provisions including Law 21— Law of 
Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region.54  
Abu Mazin manipulated the authorities of the PC 
to consolidate his grip on power in the province. 
His coalition never secured a majority in the 
29-member PC during the last two provincial 
elections (his coalition won 5 seats during the 
2009 provincial elections55 and 7 seats during 
the 2013 provincial elections56). Despite this, he 
was able to control key government positions 
and development funds and has removed/
replaced potentially challenging government 
officials mainly through buying off the loyalties 
of PC members aligned with other coalitions and 
rivalling parties.57 He offered cash, cars, property, 
and promises of future government positions to 
PC members in return for their allegiances and 
votes on critical issues that included appointing 
and removing key government officials and 
approving local development projects and 
budgets.58 
52  Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, ‘Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq’, International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, Vol.75, No.4, pp. 585-607; Matthew S. Mingus, ‘Progress and Challenges with Iraq’s Multilevel Governance’, Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 72, No. 5, September/October 2012, pp. 678-686.
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid.  
55  Musingsoniraq.blogpost.com, ‘Comparing The January 2009 to January 2005 Provincial Elections’, February 1, 2009. Available at: http://musingsoniraq.
blogspot.com/2009/02/comparing-january-2009-to-january-2005.html.  
56  The formal results of the 2013 provincial elections in Salah al-Din are available at: http://ihec.iq/ar/page53.aspx 
57  Almadapaper, ‘Political coup in Salahaddin a week after a unique visit by the Iranian ambassador to Samarra’, February 16, 2019. Available at: https://
almadapaper.net/view.php?cat=216912  
58  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
59  For an analysis of the fragmentation of Sunni Arab parties see: Renad Mansour, ‘The Sunni Predicament in Iraq’, Carnegie Middle East Centre, March 
2016. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_59_Mansour_Sunni_Final.pdf 
60  Interview with a government official from Salah al-Din, July 2020, Suleimaniyah.
61  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
62  Ghazwan Hassan al-Jabouri, ‘Power, Money, And Cousins: Political In-Fighting in Salahaddin Province Causing Municipal Chaos’, Niqash, (March 
2016). Available at: https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5218/ 
Fragmentation, lack of coherence, and clear 
political purpose beyond achieving personal 
gains characterised the Sunni coalitions and 
parties59 and allowed for expanding government 
control via political transactions. A government 
official from Salah al-Din stated, “The Sunni 
Arabs lack coherent and organised parties with 
clear political agendas and ideologies. Their 
members are often driven by personal interests 
and are ready to quickly shift side and move 
to other parties in pursuit of personal gains.”60 
This fluidity of alliances and party membership 
enabled Abu Mazin to align members of other 
parties with his own coalition and shift the 
political marketplace in his favour. 
As the two main parties in the province, Abu 
Mazin’s al-Jamahir and the IIP failed to gain 
a majority in the PC during past provincial 
elections. Other local Sunni factions representing 
certain tribes and loosely connected to Sunni 
national coalitions also secured seats in Salah 
al-Din’s PC. These PC members would cut ties 
to their Sunni national coalitions after elections 
and pursue personal/tribal gains.61 As local 
journalist Ghazwan Hassan al-Jabouri observed, 
“members of the provincial council here have 
happily flip-flopped to support whichever political 
party or person offers them money or some 
personal gain.”62 Abu Mazin bought the loyalties 
of these PC members in return for material gains 
and used their support to side-line and weaken 
the IIP, his main local rival, and consolidate his 
control in government. 
After the 2009 provincial elections, the IIP and 
Abu Mazin’s coalition — that secured 5 seats 
and 7 seats in the 29-member PC respectively— 
formed a power sharing government which 
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distributed the two key government positions 
between the two sides (the governor’s position 
was given to an IIP member while the position 
of the head of the PC was given to Abu Mazin 
himself).63 The arrangement soon broke down 
due to intensifying competition for power 
(control over employment in the public sector 
and government funds) between the two 
parties.64 After he secured the backings of 
the majority of the PC members, Abu Mazin 
removed the IIP affiliated governor and 
appointed himself as the governor of Salah al-
Din in 2011.65   
Fluidity of alliances and transactional politics 
enabled Abu Mazin to maintain the governor’s 
position after the 2013 provincial elections in 
which his party only secured 7 seats in the PC.66 
After the elections, he side-lined the IIP, which 
won 5 seats during the elections, by forming 
a power sharing government with other local 
coalitions the largest of which was headed 
by Sheikh Sha’lan Krayeem. The head of the 
influential Albu Essa tribe in Samarra (part of 
al-Sawamra tribes), Sha’lan opposed the IIP’s 
influence in the province.67 Sha’lan’s coalition 
won 5 seats during the provincial elections and 
aligned with Abu Mazin in return for appointing 
Sha’lan’s brother Ahmed Krayeem as the head 
of Salah al-Din’s PC. More than a governing 
coalition, this was a tribal pact through which 
Abu Mazin co-opted a key element of al-
Sawamra tribes and weakened the IIP.68 Indeed, 
the IIP lost much of its influence in the province 
when PC members affiliated with the party 
shifted their loyalties to Abu Mazin.69




66  Abu Mazin’s local coalition called Qal’at al-Jamahir ( ائتالف قلعة الجماهير)  won 7 seats during the 2013 provincial elections in Salah al-Din. The formal 
results of the 2013 provincial elections in Salah al-Din are available at: http://ihec.iq/ar/page53.aspx 
67  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020. See also: alnoornews.net, ‘The Islamic Party files a lawsuit against the MP Sha’lan al-Krayeem after his confession that he received funds to 
work against it’, (July 2017). Available at: https://www.alnoornews.net/archives/123662/الحزب-االسالمي-يرفع-دعوة-قضائية-ضد-الن/ 
68  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
69  Interview with a top member of the IIP in Salahaddin, August 2020, Erbil.
70  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
71  Zmkan Ali Saleem, ‘Prisoner of the Deal: Nineveh’s governor and local state capture’, LSE/Middle East Centre, March 2020. Available at: https://blogs.
lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/03/12/prisoner-of-the-deal-ninevehs-governor-and-local-state-capture/ 
72  Alsumaria.tv, ‘Salahadinn’s council removes its chairman Ahmed Karayeem’, February 25, 2019. Available at: https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/261817/; 
Alaraby.co.uk, ‘Iraq: political pressure behind removing the head of the local council in Salahaddin’, February 27, 2019. Available at: https://www.alaraby.
co.uk/العراق-ضغوطات-سياسية-وراء-إقالة-محافظ-صالح-الدين 
73  Baghdadtoday.new, ‘Representatives and notables of Samarra: behind removing al-Krayeem is a corrupt party that wants to impose its control over 
Salahaddin’s resources’, February 25, 2019. Available at: https://baghdadtoday.news/news/76213/نواب-ووجهاء-سامراء-اقالة 
74  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
Abu Mazin’s rivalling Sunni parties, mostly 
concentrated in Samarra, are uneasy about his 
large influence in the province. But they are too 
weak and too divided to pose serious challenges 
to his government control. For instance, Abu 
Mazin’s 2019 removal of Ahmed Krayeem from 
the head of the PC generated condemnation in 
the Sammara based parties and amongst tribal 
leaders but did not lead to concerted actions to 
contain al-Jamahir’s leader. In early 2019, Ahmed 
Krayeem joined Muhammed Halbousi’s new al-
Taqdum party and the two made preparations 
for expanding influence among Salah al-Din’s 
Sunni community ahead of provincial elections 
which were expected to take place at the end of 
the same year (the elections never took place).70 
Halbousi, the speaker of Iraqi parliament, is Abu 
Mazin’s national Sunni rival and the relationship 
between the two broke down in 2019 due to their 
competition over controlling Nineveh’s governor.71 
The alliance between Ahmed Krayeem was 
seen as a threat by Abu Mazin to his influence in 
the province who in response mobilised the PC 
members against Krayeem and removed him 
from his position.72 Samarra based parties such 
as Muthana Samarayee’s al-Massar, joined by 
government officials and tribal leaders in the city, 
condemned Abu Mazin’s move against Krayeem 
and accused him of unilateralism and corruption. 
However, they failed to influence Abu Mazin’s 
course of action in Salah al-Din. 73   
Indeed, the IIP, al-Massar, and Ahmed Krayeem’s 
al-Taqdum see each other as political rivals 
and lack clear vision and political agendas for 
Salah al-Din.74 Their presence and activities 
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have focused on Samarra and failed to expand 
their support bases throughout the rest of the 
province. Both the IIP and al-Massar are led 
by two Iraqi MPs who are simultaneously rich 
businessmen. Muthana al-Samarayee and 
Ammar Yousif—the IIP’s key figure in Salah 
al-Din— own government projects and large 
businesses in and outside the province.75 Key 
informants from the province stated that 
the two politicians were using their political 
influence in both Baghdad and the province 
to achieve greater business gains. They said 
the IIP’s Ammar Yousif was in fact now part of 
Abu Mazin’s commercial/government network 
through which Yousif secured government funds 
and projects.76 
Controlling government funds and businesses 
have been key to Abu Mazin’s political and 
government influence in Salah al-Din and 
beyond. He needs control over funds to finance 
his political transactions through which he 
maintains and expands his government control. 
A government official from the province referred 
to a network of individuals that Abu Mazin relied 
on for siphoning off public funds. He stated, 
“The local government allocates contracts for 
implementing service projects to rich individuals 
who then pay shares to Abu Mazin and people 
who are close to him. Between Abu Mazin and 
implementing companies are brokers who are 
often local officials and have administrative and 
security positions. Others are tribal leaders and 
businessmen.”77 
Salah al-Din is famous for rampant government 
corruption.78 According to Iraq’s central financial 
watchdog committee, the province ranks the first 
among Iraq’s 18 governorates for widespread 
corruption in the local government institutions.79 
The key oversight mechanism in the province 
disappeared as politicians like Abu Mazin 
75  Ibid.
76  Ibid. 
77  Interview with a local official from Salahaddin, August  2020, Suleimaniyah. 
78  For instance, a June 2020 government report revealed large corruption cases in the local health directorate in Salahaddin. Investigation carried out 
by the federal integrity commission showed different types of corruption including the disappearance of material and equipment worth 6000,000,000 
million Iraqi Dinars and finding forged receipts for buying fuel reaching 500,000,000 million Iraqi Dinars that was not bought in reality. See: Nasnews.com, 
‘Detecting corruption cases in a directorate in Salahaddin’, June 24, 2020. Available at: https://www.nasnews.com/view.php?cat=33883 
79  Thebaghdadpost.com, ‘Financial Watchdog Committee: Salahaddin takes the lead among the governorate for corruption’, April 16, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.thebaghdadpost.com/ar/Story/163405/الرقابة-المالية-صالح-الدين-تتصدر-المحافظات-في-الفساد 
80  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020. See also this 2013 report in Iraqi News Network in which the Iraqi MP from Salah al-Din Suhad al-Obeidi accused Abu Mazin of involve-
ment in corruption cases through capturing service provision projects in the governorate. Available at: http://aliraqnews.com/العراقية-محافظ-صالح-الدين-متورط-بملفا/ 
81  Aljazeera.net, ‘Under pressure from the protests the Iraqi parliament dismisses the provincial councils and fails in elections law’, November 11, 2019. 
Avialable at: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2019/11/27/المظاهرات-العراق-البرلمان-العراقي 
82  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
streamlined the PC with their policies allowing 
him to re-direct public funds to himself and to 
the pockets of his allies and followers.80 
Abu Mazin’s power of shaping politics in the 
governorate has not waned with the suspension 
of the PCs by the Iraqi government in December 
2019.81 He continues to command a strong 
patronage network that includes high ranking 
officials (the governor, district mayors, Director 
Generals, Police Chief, and etc.) and influential 
tribal and business leaders.82 
Among the Sunni parties and factions, Abu 
Mazin is the most influential power broker in 
the province but has not established absolute 
dominance there. His influence, however, needs 
to be understood in the context of a local power 
structure dominated by Baghdad based powerful 
Shia figures and militia leaders who supported 
and allied with Abu Mazin. The following section 
looks at the roots of the alliance between 
Shia political stakeholders and Abu Mazin and 
assesses how this alliance impacted the latter’s 
local power and control.   
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Alliances with Shia militia parties and 
figures  
Various Shia militia groups, gathered under 
the umbrella of the PMF, participated in the 
fight against IS in Salah al-Din.83 Militia groups 
like Badr, the AAH, and Saraya al-Salam (SS) 
maintained military presence in Salah al-Din well 
beyond the defeat of IS and pursued political/
ideological, security, and geostrategic goals in 
the province. In the Shia populated areas of the 
province such as Tuz-Khurmatu, Balad, and Djel, 
Badr and the AAH have mobilised members of 
the Shia community within their militia forces 
and took over their governing institutions.84 They 
have justified their presence in these areas in 
the name of protecting the Shia community and 
religious sites with symbolic significance (the SS 
militias are present in large numbers in Samarra 
for guarding the city’s Shia Shrines). In the Sunni 
areas of the province (Shirgat, Beji, Tikrit, al-Alam, 
Awja, and al-Dor), Shia militias have sought to 
prevent the re-emergence of extremist Sunni 
groups that could again pose threats to Baghdad 
and the Shia dominated government there 
(Baghdad shares its northern borders with Salah 
al-Din).85 For the pro-Iran Shia militia groups 
territorial/population control in Salah al-Din has 
a strategic value. They see the province as part 
of the land-bridge that connects the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to its allies in the Levant.86 
As stated, the Shia dominated government in 
Iraq treated Sunnis of Salah al-Din with great 
suspicion for their associations with Iraq’s 
former Ba’ath regime and did what they could to 
prevent the province from becoming the locus 
of Sunni power in Iraq. How then have Shia 
influential leaders and militia parties allowed, 
and even supported, a Sunni Arab politician to 
hold power and exert influence in this province?  
83  Reuters Staff, ‘Special Report: After Iraqi forces take Tikrit, a wave of looting and lynching’, April 3, 2015. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-mideast-crisis-iraq-tikrit-special-re-idUSKBN0MU1DP20150403; Erica Gaston & Frauke Maas, ‘Iraq after ISIL: Tikrit and Surrounding Areas’, Global Public 
Policy Institute (GPPI), August 29, 2017. Available at: https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/29/iraq-after-isil-tikrit-and-surrounding-areas; Andras Derzsi-Horvath, 
Mario Domisse, and Hana Nasser, ‘Iraq after ISIL: Baiji’, GPPI, September 13, 2017. Available at: https://www.gppi.net/2017/09/13/iraq-after-isil-baiji
84  Mac Skelton & Zmkan Ali Saleem, ‘Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries After ISIS: Heterogenous Actors Vying for Influence’, LSE/Middle East Centre 
Report, February 2019. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100100/3/DIBsReport.pdf , pp.15-20.




88  Eric Robenson, Daniel Egel, Patrick B Johnosn, Sean Mann, Alexander D. Rothenberg, and David Stebbins, ‘When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The 
Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria’, RAND, 2017. Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR1900/RR1970/RAND_RR1970.pdf , pp.163-164. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Al-Jabouri, (2019), Op.Cit. 
91  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
 Ibid. 
As an exception to their marginalization policy, 
both Baghdad government officials and Shia 
militia parties backed and even built alliances 
with Abu Mazin for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Abu Mazin operated as a bridge between 
Baghdad based authorities and the al-Jabour 
tribes, the largest and most powerful tribes in 
the north and centre of Salah al-Din. Since 2003, 
the majority of al-Jabouris refused co-optation 
by the Baghdad government but simultaneously 
needed access to state resources and jobs. This 
access has been provided by Abu Mazin who has 
enjoyed considerable support among al-Jabour 
tribes. Backing Abu Mazin allows the Iraqi federal 
government to indirectly control the al-Jabouris 
and stabilise its authority in significant parts 
of Salah al-Din province87 where a restive Sunni 
population oppose Baghdad’s rule.88
Secondly, Abu Mazin has been consistent in 
supporting and gaining the trust of the ISF and 
powerful Shia leaders like Maliki. As the deputy 
governor for security affairs (2003-2009), Abu 
Mazin collaborated with the existing ISF in Salah 
al-Din against insurgent and extremist groups 
in the province. During this period, he gained a 
reputation for being pro-government and anti-
Sunni insurgency. He continued maintaining 
strong ties with the government security forces 
when he became the head of the PC (2009-2011) 
and then governor (2011-2014).89
Abu Mazin consistently backed Maliki and his 
policies in Salah al-Din. He was a member of 
Ayad Allawi’s al-Wataniyah coalition between 
2003 and 2009. But after the provincial elections 
of 2009, he cut ties with Allawi’s alliance and 
became close to Maliki90 who ordered the 
ISF in Salah al-Din to back Abu Mazin in his 
local struggle for power with the IIP.91 More 
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importantly, Abu Mazin refused to support the 
anti-Maliki Sunni protests of 2012-2013 that 
reached Tikrit and he remained loyal to the 
Baghdad government and the ISF.92 He even 
publicly stated that the protests were infiltrated 
by the AQI and foreign countries like Qatar.93 
Finally, in his formal capacity as the governor 
and an MP from Salah al-Din Abu Mazin did 
not oppose the presence of Shia militia groups 
in the province. In return for the backing of 
the Shia militia leaders, Abu Mazin and his 
affiliated officials in Salah al-Din have for the 
most part, turned a blind eye to the presence 
and activities of militia groups in the province.94 
For instance, the government officials in Tikrit 
have not tried to practically assert authority 
over the local administrations in the Shia areas 
of the province such as Tuz-Khurmato, Balad, 
and Djel that are under the control of Badr 
and the AAH.95 The authorities in Tikrit have 
also failed to stop and act against the illegal 
practices of the Shia militias in Salah al-Din that 
included economic extortion (seeking rents from 
government projects, private businesses, and oil 
infrastructure—smuggling oil from the major oil 
refinery in Beji), land grab, and abusing the rights 
of local Sunni citizens.96 As such, Abu Mazin 
secured support from powerful militia leaders 
like Hadi Ameri, the leader of Badr and Qaiys 
Khaz’ali , the leader of the AAH.97 
Without the support of these Shia militia parties 
and powerful figures— influential in both the 
Baghdad government and on the ground in 
Salah al-Din— it would have been difficult for 
Abu Mazin to survive as a key power broker. 
Abu Mazin has had his vulnerabilities exploited 
by his rivals in the province.  One of his key 
92  Ibid. 
93  Al-Fayha TV Channel, ‘Salah al-Din Governor swears to Quran that he knows of terrorists within the protestors in Anbar and Salah al-Din’, May 2013. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTDCpJ9Or7A&feature=share 
94  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
95  Ibid. 
96  Officials from other Sunni factions, such as Ahmed Krayeem, were vocal about militia activities and practices. In 2019, Krayeem said, “most of the 
parking garages in Salahaddin are contracted to a leading figure in the PMF called (Ahmed Kabreta) who manages most of the corrupt deals and oil 
smuggling to the north of the country.” He added “some elements within the PMF are not welcomed in our governorate given their involvement in theft, 
bribery, and kidnaping. Their presence constitutes a threat to the security of the governorate.” Quoted in: The Baghdad Post, ‘Ahmed al-Krayeem: a leader in 
the sectarian PMF manages corruption deals that erode the state in Salah al-Din, December 2018, 2018. Available at:  https://www.thebaghdadpost.com/ar/
Story/139938/أحمد-الكريم-قيادي-في-الحشد-الشعبي-الطائفي-يدير-صفقات-فساد-تنخر-الدولة-في-صالح-الدين 
97  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
98  Ibid
99  Interview with a local official from Salah al-Din. August 2020, Erbil. 
100  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
weaknesses is that his party lacked clear 
structure and cohesiveness. Indeed, al-Jamahir 
does not possess clear identity/ideology nor 
economic and political agendas. Further, the 
party has little presence on the ground and lacks 
clear organisational structure (for instance the 
party does not have many visible offices and 
its members rarely hold regular meetings).98 
A local politician with knowledge about the 
party stated, “The party is a coalition based 
on shared personal economic and political 
interests of some figures who come together 
during elections in order to secure seats 
and positions within the local and national 
governing institutions. Instead of working for 
the implementation of clearly defined governing 
agendas and policies, the post-election 
coordination between the key figures of al-
Jamahir aimed to secure economic gains of 
the same figures and preserve their positions 
within the government”.99 This characteristic of 
Abu Mazin’s al-Jamahir allowed for occasional 
defections from the party. 
Shia influential figures and militia parties 
came to the aid of Abu Mazin when in 2015 
the governor of Salah al-Din, Ra’aid al-Jabouri 
defected from Abu Mazin’s coalition and 
threatened the latter’s control over the province. 
After he secured a seat in the Iraqi parliament in 
2014, Abu Mazin appointed his cousin Ra’aid as 
Salah al-Din’s governor.100 But in 2015 Abu Mazin 
returned to the province and sought to reclaim 
his former job as governor having lost his 
ministerial seat in Baghdad (he was appointed 
as State Minister for the Governorate’s Affairs in 
Haider Abdi’s government in 2015 but soon lost 
the position after Abadi decided to reduce the 
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number of ministries in his cabinet ).101 Backed by 
the powerful militia leader Abu Mahdi Muhandis 
and his local Sunni allies, including Yazan al-
Jabouri along with his father Mash’an al-Jabouri, 
Ra’aid first refused to abandon the post for Abu 
Mazin.102 
Unexpectedly, however, Ra’aid decided to resign 
from his post and give way to Abu Mazin to 
regain the governor’s position in 2016.103 Key 
informants, including government officials and 
observers from Salah al-Din, attributed Abu 
Mazin’s successful return to the governor’s 
position mainly to the support he received from 
Maliki, Khaz’ali, and Ameri. The Shia leaders 
convinced Muhandis to abandon his support 
for Ra’aid and ordered four Shia members of 
Salah al-Din’s PC to express their support to 
Abu Mazin. They added that Khaz’ali’s AAH 
militiamen were providing protection to Abu 
Mazin when he was visiting the province during 
the crisis over the governor’s position.104 Abu 
Mazin himself stated, “I have strong relations 
with the AAH leader Qayis Khaz’ali”. 105 With no 
viable alternative to support, the powerful Shia 
leaders decided to help Abu Mazin re-establish 
his formal authority in the province. 
Sunni leaders who lacked Abu Mazin’s 
aforementioned qualities failed to gain long-
term support of the Shia militia parties and 
leaders. Even though they joined the anti-IS 
war in Salah al-Din, local figures like Yazan and 
Mash’an al-Jabouri (the head of al-Watan party) 
lacked Abu Mazin’s consistency in supporting 
the ISF and maintaining stable and durable ties 
to Shia powerful leaders in Baghdad. Mash’an 
is known for frequently shifting alliances and 
political stances and along with his son Yazan 
they publicly supported the anti-Baghdad Sunni 
insurgency.106 They both were under charges 
of supporting terrorism before the rise of IS.107 
101  Almadapaper.net, (2019), Op.Cit. 
102  Al-Jabouri, (2016), Op.Cit. 
103  Rudaw.net, ‘Salahaddin provincial council: al-Jabouri resigned because he could not take the responsibility for the position’, April 6, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/060420161
104  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
105 Al-Samarra TV, ‘Interview with Salah al-Din Governor Abu Mazin’, April 2016. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvlBjkLWZRg&fea-
ture=share 
106  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
107  Samaha, (2016), Op.Cit.
108  Ibid. 
109  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
110  Ibid. 
These charges were dropped against them for 
purely tactical reasons, namely the Shia leaders’ 
needs for their help in mobilising local Sunni 
fighters against IS in the province.108 Therefore, 
they failed to gain the support of Shia leaders 
and militia parties to take control of Salah al-Din. 
Both Mash’an and Yazan are staunch opponents 
of Abu Mazin and have tried to weaken and 
end his role in the province. They attempted 
to achieve this by supporting Ra’aid during the 
crisis over the governor’s position in 2016 and 
via bringing corruption charges against Abu 
Mazin. Indeed, Abu Mazin was imprisoned 
by government authorities in 2017 based on 
numerous corruption charges that were brought 
against him.109 Those charges were later dropped 
and Abu Mazin was freed by the courts. Key 
informants asserted that the court’s decision to 
release Abu Mazin was influenced by his alliance 
with powerful Shia political figures and militia 
leaders.110 Again, the alliance with powerful Shia 
stakeholders ensured Abu Mazin’s survival as a 
key power broker. 
While they cooperated with Shia militias, Yazan 
and Mash’an failed to deal with the contra-
dictions associated with such cooperation. In 
contrast, Abu Mazin allied with key Shia stake-
holders within the Iraqi system and this allowed 
him access to national funds which he used to 
maintain and strengthen his patronage network. 
Abu Mazin secured the support of the Jabouris 
by providing members of the tribe with access to 
state resources and by refraining from direct at-
tachment to the Shia militias. To further balance 
the contradictions associated with the alliance 
with Shia militias and leaders, Abu Mazin relied 
on identity politics, another key lever of his power 
addressed in the following section. 
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Identity politics
The trauma of displacement and enduring 
the violations of Shia militias have become 
defining features of the Sunnis’ identity and 
consciousness that Abu Mazin and his allied 
government officials have tapped into through 
their public rhetoric. They have continued relying 
on moral populism111 as a mechanism of power, 
despite their public denunciation of sectarianism 
 Abu Mazin and his affiliated government .(الطائفية)
officials adopted a discourse that sought to: 
(1) mobilise members of the Sunni community 
in their own favour; (2) evade the responsibility 
for their failure to provide services and 
reconstruction in the province; and (3) distance 
themselves from human rights violations 
committed by Shia militias against Sunni 
citizens. 
The war with IS brought countless sufferings to 
the members of Salah al-Din’s Sunni community 
and large numbers of them fled their homes and 
became IDPs outside the province.112 For many of 
those IDPs the road to return has been difficult 
and complicated. Some of them have lost their 
entire sources of their livelihoods (homes, lands, 
and properties),113 while others have been forced 
to pay compensations for crimes they have not 
committed.114 The defeat of IS in the province has 
not ended the sufferings for the Sunnis. 
Shia militias are still present across the province 
and are applying security pressure on the Sunni 
Arabs.115 They stop, harass, and arrest Sunnis 
based on their perceived ties to extremist 
groups like IS.116 The militias have been accused 
of extreme human rights abuses including 
unlawful killings of Sunni citizens.117 Shia militia 
111  In the Political Marketplace framework, moral populism refers to the ability “to both mobilize and divide populations by deploying exclusivist and 
religious and ethnic rhetoric.” De Waal, Op.Cit.
112  Landinfo, Op.Cit, pp.17-19.; IOM, ‘Return Dynamics In Salah Al-Din Governorate’, July 2020. Available at:  http://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/ReturnIn-
dex/2020722736598_iom_dtm_Return_Dynamics_In_Salah_al_Din_Jul2020.pdf. 
113  Gaston & Domisse, Op.Cit.
114  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020. 
115  Gaston & Domisse, Op.Cit. 
116  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020. 
117  Shelly Kittleson, ‘Killing of Sunni youths prompts calls for end to impunity in Iraq’, al-monitor, October 2020. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2020/10/iraq-salahuddin-sunni-pmu.html 
118  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020. 
119  Ibid. 
120  Ali Mamouri, ‘Conflict erupts over properties surrounding Samarra shrine’, al-monitor, January 23, 2019. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2019/01/samarra-askarian-shrine-saladin-iraq.html
121  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020. 
122  Ibid.
involvement in land grab and economic extortion 
in Salah al-Din has led to damages to the private 
and general economic interests of the Sunnis 
in the province.118 In Awja, for instance, militias 
of Brigade 35 have confiscated farming lands 
that are owned by local Sunnis.119 In Samarra, 
Sunni citizens are prevented by SS militias from 
reaching their business lands located near the 
Shia Shrines in the city.120 The militias have used 
their coercive power to profit from government 
service projects, slowing down and preventing 
reconstruction and development in the province. 
The AAH militias, for instance, have forced 
private companies working on infrastructure 
projects around Balad district to pay them 
shares.121 
Abu Mazin appealed to Sunni moral populism 
during election times in order to enhance his 
party’s electoral gains among the province’s 
Sunni citizens. During the May 2018 elections, 
for instance, he increased his anti-Shia militia 
rhetoric to ally with the concerns and sufferings 
of Salah al-Din’s Sunni community and secure 
their votes.122 He specifically highlighted the 
coercive and intimidating behaviour of the 
Shia militias towards members of the Sunni 
community through his discourse. During a 
May 2018 TV interview Abu Mazin stated, “The 
existing armed factions in Salah al-Din force 
citizens in the southern, eastern, and northern 
parts of the province to vote for the candidates 
that those armed actors prefer…in the town 
of Yathrib men are gathered by AAH militias 
everyday and are told to vote for a certain 
candidate who is aligned with the AAH…they 
want to gain peoples’ support via intimidation 
and threat…They threaten people with re-
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displacement to Kurdistan Region and with 
arrests …I cannot accept this violation of citizens’ 
rights…there is no freedom for Arabs, especially 
for Sunni Arabs.”123 
Both Abu Mazin and his affiliated current 
governor of Salah al-Din Ammar Jabr Khalil have 
employed moral populism to escape criticism 
directed against them for lack of services and 
reconstruction in the province. In their discourse, 
they blamed Shia militias for preventing 
reconstruction and private investment.124 They 
used this discourse specifically in regards 
to areas in the province they ignored such 
as Samarra which operated as a base for 
rivalling parties to Abu Mazin. In response to 
a question for why he did not pay attention 
to Samarra, Abu Mazin appealed to the city’s 
Sunni citizens by stressing on the economic 
hardship they endured under the rule of SS 
militias. He stated, “How do I help Samarra while 
the city has become a prison for its citizens?... 
The city is militarised and the militarisation of 
society is very dangerous. It does not allow for 
reconstruction and investment and leads to 
corruption and restriction of freedom… They use 
the protection of the shrines as a justification 
for keeping large armed forces there. The people 
there are starved to death and the hotels and 
restaurants are closed…do they want to create 
another Daesh by starving people to death?”125 
Moral populism allows Abu Mazin and his 
affiliated governor to distance themselves from 
Shia militia extreme violations of the rights of 
Sunni citizens in Salah al-Din. Since the defeat 
of the IS in the province, Shia militias have 
occasionally engaged in unlawful killings of 
innocent Sunni citizens without impunity. No 
security force in the province, including the ISF, 
has been able to defend the Sunni citizens from 
123  Al-Arabiya al-Hadath TV, ‘Salahaddin governor Ahmed Abdullah al-Jabouri described security oppression and threats of voters by the PMF in the gover-
norate as disaster’, May 9, 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfzROa-vk7M
124  See two consecutive TV interviews with the current governor Ammar Jabr Khalil: Al-Tagheer TV Channel, ‘From Baghdad: interview with Salahaddin 
governor’, First Episode, July, 7, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNkywGOerjs;  Al-Tagheer TV Channel, ‘From Baghdad: interview with 
Salahaddin governor’, Second Episode, July, 9, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DT19wJTMJQY&feature=share; and this interview 
with Abu Mazin: al-Sharqiya TV, ‘Luabat al-Karasi’, May 2020a. Available at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h83pd3jVWr4&feature=share 
125  NRT Arabic, ‘Tjina al-Salifa’, May 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0IcB5yHbt2o&feature=share 
126  In-person and phone interviews with several current and former government officials, local journalists, and observers from Salah al-Din, July 1– Sep-
tember 25, 2020.
127  Ibid. 
128  Kittleson, (2020), Op.Cit. 
129  Alsharqiya TV, ‘Lua’bat al-Karasi: the Balad massacre shocks the country’, October 2020b. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGC_RzrB-
70w&feature=share 
130  Ibid. 
the Shia militias, particularly in the far southern 
district of Balad where AAH militias (Brigades 
41 and 42) have been present alongside formal 
government forces (Commando regiments from 
the interior ministry).126 In this mixed Sunni-Shia 
district, Sunnis who had returned after the defeat 
of IS have been intimidated and threatened by 
the existing AAH militias and some of them have 
consequently chosen to leave their homes again 
(re-displaced) out of the fear of being targeted 
by the militias.127 In October 2020, eight Sunni 
citizens from the district’s Farhatiyah village 
were abducted and executed by unknown armed 
men but the perpetrators of the massacre were 
widely believed to be members of the AAH 
militias.128 The response of governor Khalil to the 
Farhatiya incident shows how Abu Mazin and his 
allies use discourse to distance themselves from 
Shia militia violence and side with the victims of 
that violence and the larger Sunni community in 
the province. 
The governor presented himself as the victims’ 
defender who sought to reveal the perpetrators 
and hold them to account. He ruled out IS 
members as perpetrators of the killings by 
stating that “the incident was not a terrorist 
act but a criminal one”.129 He blamed the forces 
who held ground in the area (AAH militia and 
a Commando regiment of interior ministry) for 
their negligence and for allowing the perpetrators 
(20 armed men) to enter to the village and 
abduct the victims.  He stated “as governor 
and the head of the security committee in the 
province I am unable to go to the area where the 
incident took place without the permission of the 
existing security forces there. Then how come 20 
armed men (the perpetrators) passed through to 
the village without the permission of the security 
forces that hold ground in the area?”130 Short of 
directly accusing the Shia militias of conducting 
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the killings he left no question for the existence 
of some form of collaboration between the 
security forces in the area and the perpetrators. 
He thus sided with the Sunni citizens and against 
criminals and their collaborators among the Shia 
militias and formal security forces. 
In his discourse, governor Khalil suggested for 
the removal of the Shia militias in Salah al-Din 
to prevent the reoccurrence of future violations 
despite the fact that he held no power over the 
movement of armed forces in the province. 
He criticised the way in which the province 
was blanketed with multiple security forces by 
stating, “in one village there are security forces 
from three different ministries. Why and how is 
this reasonable? How security is administered 
in the light of the lack of a clear command 
structure and coordination between these 
forces?”.131 He then demanded that the PMF and 
the army to be removed from the province, and 
for the local police to be tasked with protecting 
the security of the cities and towns of Salah 
al-Din. He stated, “We are absolutely convinced 
that the local police are capable of providing 
security to the province…We don’t need these 
other overlapping security forces… This is the 
only solution”.132 This discourse allowed Khalil 
to align himself with the members of the 
Sunni community whose security and physical 
existence were threatened by the presence 
of the Shia militias in their province. Further, 
the governor’s suggestion for local police to 
take control of the province’s internal security 
resonated with the Sunni citizens given the fact 
the majority of the members of the local police 
were Sunni Arabs from the province and were 
unlikely to engage in extreme violence against 
their own community.   
Through his discourse, Khalil highlighted how 
incidents like the one in Farhatiyah increased the 
feelings of insecurity among the Sunnis of Salah 
al-Din and enhanced the idea of creating an 
autonomous region in the province among them. 
He stated, “Today we listen to our people and 
all of them seek the creation of an autonomous 
131  Aldijla TV, ‘The detail of the crime in Balad provided by the governor of Salah al-Din’, October 2020. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=RALJn5BIJwQ&feature=share 
132  Ibid. 
133  Alsharqiya TV, (2020b), Op.Cit. 
134  Iraq-business news, ‘Salahaddin Province Declares Autonomy’, October 2011. Available at: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/10/28/salahad-
din-province-declares-autonomy/ 
region…They seek a place where they feel secure. 
We are against tearing Iraq apart but go to Salah 
al-Din and conduct a survey and ask people 
whether they want an autonomous region and 
see what they say… I would say that no less than 
70% of the province’s people would say yes for 
the creation of an autonomous region.”133 
The idea of creating an autonomous region 
which denotes greater local control over the 
affairs of the province has had support among 
the Sunni elites and ordinary citizens of Salah 
al-Din. In 2011, for instance, the majority of 
the PC members of the governorate voted in 
favour of creating an autonomous region but 
the motion was opposed and rejected by the 
Baghdad government under Maliki.134 It is not a 
surprise that the idea now has greater resonance 
among the Sunnis of the province given their 
sufferings under the rule of the Shia militias.  
Khalil’s discourse must be understood within 
this context in which he attempted to ally with 
the demands and ambitions of Salah al-Din’s 
Sunni community in order to enhance his local 
acceptance. 
Conclusions & Policy 
Recommendations 
Through the case of Salah al-Din, this research 
has shown that Sunni exclusion in Iraq exists but 
is layered. While the Sunni population remained 
marginalised and structurally disadvantaged, the 
Sunni elites became fully part of the post-2003 
system and benefited from it. Unlike ordinary 
Sunni citizens, who continued to suffer under 
the rule of Shia militias and the ISF, the Sunni 
elites operated on a different level and integrated 
themselves into the Muhassasah system and 
accessed state resources and prerogatives via 
different tactics and mechanisms. This dynamic 
of both Sunni marginalisation and empowerment 
was demonstrated through examining the 
sources and levers of Abu Mazin’s power in 
Salah al-Din that included tribal connections, 
transactional exchanges, alliances with Shia 
influential figures and militia parties, and identity 
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politics.  Leveraging these mechanisms, Abu 
Mazin became a key power broker within a 
fragmented, but at same time competitive, 
political marketplace.  
Abu Mazin’s influence is partially tied to the 
continuing relevance and power of tribes in the 
Sunni areas of Iraq, namely the authority of al-
Jabour tribes in Salah al-Din. He satisfied the 
needs of al-Jabour for state resources and jobs 
via his connections with Shia influential figures. 
Meanwhile, he addressed a key concern of the 
Jabouris (their distrust and resentment for Shia 
militias) by maintaining pragmatic relations with 
the Shia figures and militia groups as opposed to 
direct attachment to Shia militia organisations. 
The ability to deal with such contradictions 
allowed Abu Mazin to secure a stable electoral 
support base in the province. In addition to 
tribal ties, Abu Mazin relied on transactional 
politics in order to maintain and expand his 
government control. Fluidity of alliances and 
party membership allowed him to purchase the 
loyalties of government officials (particularly 
PC members) tied to other parties and factions 
in exchange for material rewards shifting the 
political marketplace in his own favour.  
Abu Mazin, however, owed his survival as an 
influential player mainly to his alliance with Shia 
figures and militia parties powerful in both the 
Baghdad government and on the ground in Salah 
al-Din. As a Sunni Arab government official, 
Abu Mazin proved himself as a trustworthy ally 
to Shia influential figures and militia leaders 
by supporting their policies and serving their 
strategic and economic interests in the province. 
In return, the alliance provided him with access 
to the government in Baghdad which had been 
key to maintaining his control in Salah al-Din. 
Meanwhile, he attempted to prevent this alliance 
from damaging his reputation and acceptance 
among the province’s Sunni Arab citizens—
who continued to suffer from the same Shia 
militias—, by relying on identity politics and 
appealing to the Sunni identity of Salah al-Din’s 
Sunni citizens. Abu Mazin and government 
officials allied with him used discourse in order 
to distance themselves from the violations of 
the Shia militias and ally with the concerns of 
the Sunni community and to mobilise the Sunni 
citizens for their own support.  
The survival of Abu Mazin as a key power broker 
in the future depends on his ability to deal with 
his vulnerabilities.  Given Iraq’s financial crisis, 
caused by Covid 19 and the plummeting oil 
prices, allocation of funds from the national 
budget to the governorates could lower 
considerably. This, in turn, could shrink Abu 
Mazin’s political budget and undermine his ability 
to maintain the support of local government 
officials and the loyalties of al-Jabour tribes. 
Further, Abu Mazin’s competition with other 
Sunni influential figures like Muhammed 
Halbousi on the national level has blown back 
against him in his core area of support in Salah 
al-Din. Both national and local rivals could 
possibly try to undermine Abu Mazin’s influence 
by encouraging defections within his coalition 
in the province as was the case with Ra’aid al-
Jabouri in 2015. 
Moreover, Abu Mazin’s survival ultimately 
depends on his alliance with Shia influential 
figures and militia party leaders and if these Shia 
stakeholders decided to abandon him, he would 
have little chance to survive as a key power 
broker.  In December 2020, the Iraqi appeal court 
banned Abu Mazin from participating in future 
elections due to the fact that he was previously 
pardoned for involvement in corruption cases. 
To change the court’s decision, Abu Mazin needs 
the backing of Shia influential leaders such 
Maliki, Ameri, and Khaza’ali whose role proved 
crucial in helping him out of prison in 2017 after 
he was formally charged with corruption by the 
courts.     
The research proposes that in order to influence 
the dynamics of the political marketplace in 
Salah al-Din in favour of the Sunni citizens, 
reform minded officials in the Government 
of Iraq (GoI) with the support of international 
community (UNAMI, European Union, US, and 
the UK) should take the following steps:
1. Restore effective oversight mechanisms to 
fight corruption in the province’s governance 
institutions. Large amounts of the funds 
allocated to Salah al-Din from the national 
government are wasted in the dynamics of 
political transactions, formation of patronage 
networks and political competition. Only 
provincial elections can help in restoring 
robust oversight mechanisms over the 
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local institutions in the province in the long 
run. Until provincial elections are held, the 
GoI with the support of the international 
community should devise alternative 
oversight mechanisms that help in holding 
local officials accountable and in distributing 
funds and resources among the province’s 
population in a fair manner.  
2. Hold provincial elections in order to change 
the current power dynamics and re-establish 
public authority in the province. The lack of 
provincial elections since 2013 perpetuated 
the current power dynamics that favours 
certain elites. Local officials, including PC 
members, sold their loyalties for personal 
gains thinking that provincial elections would 
not take place and voters would not have the 
chance to punish them for their behaviour 
by not voting for them in future elections. 
Provincial elections could potentially allow 
ordinary citizens to elect candidates they 
prefer and, thus, have greater control over 
the local government. However, provincial 
elections may not pave the way for the re-
establishment of a more accountable and 
cohesive public authority in the province 
unless those elections take place under 
robust international oversight. 
3. Devise a security policy in Salah al-Din that 
is more appreciative of the Sunni citizens’ 
concerns. In tandem with fighting terrorism 
in the province, the GoI should ensure that 
the multiple and large security forces in 
Salah al-Din operate according to clear and 
coherent command and control structure. 
Realistically, this is the least that the GoI 
can do to prevent the recurrence of cases 
of mass killings of Sunni citizens such as 
the October 2020 incident in Farhatiya/
Balad. Such incidents deepen the sense of 
marginalisation among the Sunnis and only 
enable local power brokers to capitalise on 
them.     
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